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The Cost of Territoriality:     
Jus Cogens Claims Against 
Corporations 
Ursula Tracy Doyle   
Introduction  
In Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, the United States Supreme Court 
held that “foreign corporations may not be defendants in suits 
brought under the [Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”)],” a U.S. federal 
statute.1 The ATS states that “[t]he district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed 
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”2 In 
Jesner, foreign nationals sought jurisdiction over a claim against a 
Jordanian financial entity, with a New York office, pursuant to the 
ATS, alleging that the entity’s agents effectively financed terrorist 
groups in the Middle East.3  These plaintiffs further alleged that this 
conduct caused or facilitated their injuries or their decedents’ deaths, 
which occurred abroad.4  In reaching its holding, the Court concluded 
that the text of the ATS does not evidence Congress’s intent for the 
statute to confer jurisdiction over claims against corporations;5 
international law does not recognize corporate liability;6 little 
authority exists at international law to hold corporations accountable 
for the acts of their agents;7 and judicial recognition of corporate  
 Associate Professor of Law, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern 
Kentucky University; A.B., Cornell University; M.A., Columbia 
University; J.D., Indiana University-Bloomington School of Law.  I 
thank the members of the CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW for their very helpful editorial assistance.  Any and 
all errors herein are, of course, my own. 
1. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1407 (2018). The Court’s 
exclusion of foreign corporations from the ambit of the ATS was five 
years in coming.  The Court was first poised to answer the question of 
corporate liability under the statute in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum. However, despite two rounds of argument and briefing in the 
case, the Court did not answer the question of the statute’s jurisdiction 
over corporations but rather of its jurisdiction over claims largely 
regarding foreign conduct.  See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013).       
2. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (1948).  
3. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1393. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. at 1402-1403. 
6. Id. at 1400-1402. 
7. Id. at 1402. 
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liability would invade the province of the legislative branch8 and 
improvidently frustrate U.S. foreign relations.9 
The Court expressly limited its holding to foreign corporations,10 
but made clear that it saw no reason to use the ATS to confer subject 
matter jurisdiction over a claim against a U.S. corporation given the 
ability of diversity jurisdiction to do the same.11  Moreover, it 
observed that Congress’s choice not to include corporate liability in 
the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, a companion statute to 
the ATS (which creates a cause of action for torture and extrajudicial 
killing)12 was “all but dispositive of the present case.”13 This logic 
would also apply, of course, to U.S. corporations.  
Nonetheless, given the express limitation of the Court’s holding, 
whether a U.S. corporation will be subject to ATS jurisdiction 
continues to be determined by the parameters set in Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum14 and RJR Nabisco v. European Community, which 
appear to require a territorial connection between the underlying 
claim and the United States for ATS jurisdiction to lie.15 Accordingly, 
rather than enter the debate on the soundness of the Court’s 
rationales for excluding foreign corporations from ATS jurisdiction, 
this essay will consider the apparent disjunction between the Court’s 
effective limitation of liability for the U.S. corporation, pursuant to 
Kiobel and RJR Nabisco, for perhaps even the most heinous acts, and 
the more expansive liability for the natural person, pursuant to the 
same cases, for the same acts.   
Congress enacted the ATS, in 1789, to provide jurisdiction for a 
limited set of international law violations, including infringements 
against ambassadors, denials of safe travel, and piracy.16  Although 
rarely invoked during its first 167 years,17  in 1980, the United States 
 
8. Id. at 1402-1403. 
9. Id. at 1403, 1406-1408. 
10. Id. at 1437, note. (“Because this case involves a foreign corporation, we 
have no need to reach the question whether an alien may sue a United 
States corporation under the ATS.”). 
11. Id. 
12. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350, note. 
13. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1404. 
14. 133 S. Ct. 1659. 
15. 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016). 
16. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2759 (2004) (explaining 
that, at the time that Congress enacted the ATS, Congress intended the 
ATS to furnish jurisdiction for a small set of international law 
violations).  
17. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663 (asserting that the ATS was only invoked 
twice in the late 18th century, and once more in the next 167 years). 
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,18 
allowed foreign plaintiffs, whose decedent was tortured and killed by a 
foreign defendant in a foreign country, to use the statute as a conduit 
to recovery.19  The success of that “foreign-cubed” case transformed 
the statute from yesteryear’s relic to today’s innovative human rights 
tool.   
Historically, the foreign-cubed claim, brought pursuant to the 
ATS, alleged the most egregious of human rights abuses, the jus 
cogens violation.  In Kiobel, the Court clearly rejected jurisdiction 
over the foreign-cubed claim before it, which alleged indirect liability 
against a corporation for jus cogens violations, because the claim 
lacked sufficient connection to the territorial United States.20 It is less 
clear but certainly arguable that both Kiobel and RJR Nabisco 
preclude ATS jurisdiction, as well, over the claim which alleges direct 
liability against a corporation for a jus cogens violation, barring 
sufficient connection between the claim and the territorial United 
States.  
By contrast, there is reason to believe that Kiobel and RJR 
Nabisco do not preclude a foreign-cubed claim from being brought 
under the ATS, if that claim alleges direct liability21 for a jus cogens 
violation against a natural person, as these cases do not concern a 
claim of this kind22 and do not, in any meaningful way, speak to a 
claim with this structure.23 This disjunction would result in higher 
accountability for the natural person who violates a jus cogens norm 
than for the juridical one, a distinction that defies doctrinal 
explanation and warrants future action by the Court.24 
 
18. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
19. Id. at 890.  
20. See generally Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659. 
21. A claim of indirect liability for a jus cogens violation against a natural 
person is unlikely to sustain jurisdiction because it is too close to that 
which the Court rejected in Kiobel.  See generally id. Moreover, in his 
Kiobel concurrence, Justice Breyer indicated that the plaintiffs’ case was 
weak in part because it only alleged indirect liability.  See 133 S. Ct. at 
1678 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) (“And the plaintiffs allege, 
not that the defendants directly engaged in acts of torture, genocide, or 
the equivalent, but that they helped others (who are not American 
nationals) to do so.”). 
22. See generally Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659; RJR Nabisco, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 
2090. 
23. Id. Of course, the Jesner holding would be irrelevant to this claim as 
this holding concerned foreign corporations. See Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 
1407. 
24. See Ursula Tracy Doyle, The Whole Wide World: Recognizing Jus 
Cogens Violations Under the Alien Tort Statute, 24 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
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I.  Jus Cogens Norms 
The jus cogens norm prohibits genocide,25 torture26 and other 
egregious conduct.  It surpasses all other international law norms,27 
protects basic values,28 commits every State29 and allows no 
derogation.30 Because this norm reflects the commitment of the 
international community to protect against the very worst human 
rights atrocities, its breach affronts every State and triggers universal 
jurisdiction.31 Although settled and sacred at the international level, 
this norm is of unclear value to the United States Supreme Court.32     
Indeed, in Kiobel, the Court did not even attempt to evaluate the 
significance of the plaintiffs’ claims that the defendant corporations 
aided and abetted the jus cogens violations of genocide and torture 
(as opposed to less egregious conduct).33 The Court, instead, focused 
on a matter of statutory interpretation to the exclusion of addressing 
the meaning, at international law, of such grievous allegations.34  
While this essay does not suggest that the Court should have 
refrained from considering matters of form,35 it does suggest that the 
underlying allegations--foreign-cubed though they were—warranted 
detailed examination to better evaluate the circumstances that might 
rebut the canon of statutory interpretation that the Court interposed 
known as the “presumption against extraterritoriality.”36 In other  
25. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 217 (AM. LAW INST. 
2016) [hereinafter Foreign Relations].  
26. See Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (agreeing that official acts of torture are a jus cogens 
violation). 
27. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Second Rep. on Jus Cogens by Dire Tladi, 
Special Rapporteur Sixty-ninth Session, UN. Doc. A/CN.4/706, at 12 
(Mar. 16, 2017) (explaining that the view that jus cogens norms are 
superior to other rules is a generally accepted idea).  
28. See id. at 10. 
29. See id. at 15. 
30. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331.   
31. Foreign Relations, supra note 25, at § 217.  
32. See Sévrine Knuchel, State Immunity and the Promise of Jus Cogens, 9 
NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 149, 155 (2011) (describing current U.S. court 
view regarding state immunity in cases of human rights violations.). 
33. See generally Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659. 
34. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664-67.  
35. See Anthony Colangelo, The Frankenstein’s Monster of 
Extraterritoriality Law, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND, 51-52 (2016) 
[http://perma.cc/Q8W2-APS4]. 
36. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665. 
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words, given the purpose of the ATS, namely to provide jurisdiction 
for causes alleging torts in violation of the law of nations, the gravity 
of the allegation is relevant to the jurisdictional analysis.37 
II. THE MEANING OF KIOBEL AND RJR NABISCO TO 
ALLEGED JUS COGENS VIOLATIONS BY CORPORATIONS 
In Kiobel, the plaintiffs, Nigerian nationals, alleged that the 
defendants, foreign corporations, provided compensation and other 
property to the Nigerian military, which the military used to commit 
the violations noted above.38  The plaintiffs sought jurisdiction 
pursuant to the ATS.  In elaborating on the application of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality to the statute, the Court 
stated:   
On these facts, all the relevant conduct took place outside the 
United States. And even where the claims touch and concern 
the territory of the United States, they must do so with 
sufficient force to displace the presumption against 
extraterritorial application. Corporations are often present in 
many countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere 
corporate presence suffices.39 
Here, the Court repeatedly privileges territoriality in claims brought 
against the corporation, suggesting that “relevant conduct” must 
occur in the United States; the claim must “touch and concern” the 
United States; and something more than “mere corporate presence” 
must occur in the United States to sustain ATS jurisdiction.40 
Given this emphasis on territoriality and the Kiobel facts, one 
must broadly assume that any allegation of indirect liability for a jus 
cogens violation against a corporation, where the claim does not 
“touch and concern the United States,” is insufficient to rebut the 
presumption of extraterritoriality.41 This limitation on liability over 
indirect commission of jus cogens violations, barring the requisite U.S. 
connection, excises a vast swathe of corporate defendants from human 
rights cases.42   
 
37. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (1948).  
38. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662-63 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). 
39. Id. at 1669. 
40. Id.  
41. Id. at 1660-64.  
42. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) 
(expressing the opinion that limitations on jurisdiction would prevent 
the U.S. from becoming a safe harbor). 
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Perhaps one must also assume that this holding forbids ATS 
jurisdiction over claims alleging direct liability for a jus cogens 
violation against a corporation, where the claim does not “touch and 
concern the United States,” although the Court has not explicitly 
made this point.43  Theoretically, however, a jus cogens violation, 
because of its disapprobation at international law, touches and 
concerns all States.  Perhaps it would especially touch and concern 
the United States if the alleged perpetrator is both a U.S. corporation 
and accused of directly committing the atrocity. The incapacity of 
ATS jurisdiction to sound over corporations in this category would 
exempt an already outsized class of defendants from accountability for 
unambiguous international law breaches.   
RJR Nabisco furthers the notion that territoriality governs the 
question of ATS jurisdiction, although, like Kiobel, it did not decide 
the question for all claims brought pursuant to the ATS.44 In this 
case, the European Community sued RJR Nabisco, pursuant to the 
Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), for alleged 
money-laundering in the European Union.45  Primed to determine 
whether RICO had extraterritorial application, the Court prescribed a 
two-step framework for analyzing whether any federal statute had 
extraterritorial application.46   
The Court opined that, when confronted with this question, 
courts must first determine “whether the statute gives a clear, 
affirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially.”47  If the 
statute gives such an indication, stated the Court, then it can be 
applied abroad.48  If the statute does not give such an indication, then 
courts must proceed to the second prong of the framework and 
determine if “conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the 
United States.”49 The Court continued that “[i]f the conduct relevant 
to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States, then the case 
involves a permissible domestic application even if other conduct 
occurred abroad.”50  However, the Court observed that “if the conduct  
43. See Daniel Prince, Corporate Liability for International Torts: Did the 
Second Circuit Misinterpret the Alien Tort Statute, 8 SETON HALL CIR. 
REV. 43, 47-50 (2011) (citing cases in which the court has refused to 
apply the ATS or dismissed ATS claims against corporations). 
44. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100-01 
(2016) (discussing two-step framework for analyzing extraterritoriality 
issues). 
45. Id. at 2090. 
46. Id. at 2093.  
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relevant to the focus occurred in a foreign country, then the case 
involves an impermissible extraterritorial application regardless of any 
other conduct that occurred in U.S. territory.”51 While this 
formulation raises questions—namely regarding the identification of 
the ATS “focus” and the meaning of “relevant conduct” and “other 
conduct”—it also furthers the notion that the Court deems important 
a significant territorial connection with the United States for the 
statute at issue to apply extraterritorially.52 When read together, 
Kiobel and RJR Nabisco certainly appear to require such a connection 
for ATS jurisdiction to lie over a  jus cogens claim alleging indirect 
liability of a corporation.  They may also require this connection for 
this jurisdiction to lie over the direct liability claim as well.     
III. The INCONSISTENCY OF PRECLUDING JUS COGENS 
CLAIMS AGAINST CORPORATIONS ABSENT TERRITORIALITY 
As suggested above, it is somewhat of an open question whether 
the Court’s holding in Kiobel and its two-step framework in RJR 
Nabisco apply to foreign-cubed claims alleging direct liability for a jus 
cogens violation against a natural person.53  Kiobel did, after all, 
concern a foreign-cubed claim alleging indirect liability for jus cogens 
violations against a juridical person.  Additionally, the letter of the 
Court’s holding seemed restricted essentially to claims against 
corporations when it held that “[c]orporations are often present in 
many countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate 
presence suffices.”54  This holding suggests that there is a territoriality 
requirement for ATS jurisdiction over corporations that may not exist 
for such jurisdiction over a natural person.55  Similarly, RJR Nabisco 
concerned the application of RICO to the extraterritorial conduct of a 
corporation and the Court’s two-part framework arose within the 
corporate context.56 
 
51. Id.  
52. Id. at 2106. 
53. See supra note 24; David Nersessian, International Human Rights 
Litigation: A Guide for Judges, INT’L HUM. RTS. LITIG., 42-43 (2016) 
(stating that the federal courts of appeals are divided over when private 
actors can be held liable in violating international law). 
54. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. 
55. Id.  
56. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2100-2101.  The circumstances that 
informed and gave rise to the Court’s framework are the application of § 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to the overseas conduct of 
the corporate defendant in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 
130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010), the application of the ATS to the overseas 
conduct of the corporate defendant in Kiobel and the application of 
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The apparent difference in standards for each class of defendant 
undermines the goal of the ATS—to provide jurisdiction over torts in 
violation of the law of nations.57 Corporations can commit these 
violations—even of jus cogens norms.58 Indeed, in her Jesner dissent, 
Justice Sotomayor states that “[i]mmunizing corporations that 
violated human rights from liability under the ATS undermines the 
system of accountability for law-of-nations violations that the First 
Congress endeavored to impose.  It allows these entities to take 
advantage of the benefits of the corporate form and enjoy 
fundamental rights, without having to shoulder attendant 
fundamental responsibilities.”59  Kiobel, RJR Nabisco and Jesner, 
collectively, make patent, however, the Court’s view that ATS 
jurisdiction is most appropriately conferred over claims against the 
natural person. 
Conclusion 
Jesner plainly precludes ATS jurisdiction over foreign 
corporations for even the most egregious human rights violations 
(regardless of the type of liability alleged).  While, in that decision, 
the Court did not answer the question of ATS jurisdiction over the 
 
RICO to the overseas conduct of the corporate defendant in RJR 
Nabisco.   
58. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1397 (quoting Sosa,124 S. Ct. at  2759 (2004) 
(“The history teaches that Congress drafted the ATS ‘to furnish 
jurisdiction for a relatively modest set of actions alleging violations of 
the law of nations.’”). 
58. See Robert C. Thompson, Anita Ramasastry, &  Mark B. 
Taylor, Translating UNOCAL: The Expanding Web of Liability for 
Business Entities Implicated in International Crimes, 40 GEO. WASH. 
INT’L L. REV. 841, 871 (2009) (discussing attachment of criminal liability 
to corporations through its officers, directors, employees, or agents); see 
also Brief of Amici Curiae Nuremberg Scholars in Support of Petitioners 
at 3, Jesner, et al., v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 16-499 (2017) (“What this 
history teaches is that the diplomats and jurists of the era understood 
that juridical persons can violate international law and can be held 
legally accountable for doing so through criminal, civil or any other type 
of remedy depending on the operative jurisdictional framework.”); see 
also Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 
(2008) (observing that, in a recent study of “all industry sectors,” 
respondents alleged that corporations were “directly” responsible for 
roughly sixty percent of the human rights violations). 
59. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1437 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted) Although specifically directing her attention to the Court’s 
holding concerning foreign corporations, Justice Sotomayor makes a 
point with broad application.   
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U.S. corporation, this jurisdiction continues to be subject to the 
constraints of Kiobel and RJR Nabisco.  Kiobel clearly limits the 
liability of the corporation accused of indirect commission of a jus 
cogens violation, if the claim does not “touch and concern the United 
States.”60  Both Kiobel and RJR Nabisco--together, if not separately—
perhaps also limit the liability of the corporate defendant accused of 
direct commission of this act, if that claim is not sufficiently 
connected to the territorial United States.  If territoriality is the 
linchpin for ATS jurisdiction over the U.S. corporation, then perhaps 
its steepest cost is the claim of direct liability for a jus cogens 
violation that lacks this precondition, a result at severe odds with the 
treatment of the jus cogens norm at international law and the 




60. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.  
